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This thesis examines the relationship between democracy and membership in the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a supply-side form of arms control. The thesis uses the 
focused comparison approach, investigating Brazil (a member of the MTCR) and the People's 
Republic of China (a non-member). Four independent variables are tested: democratic 
institutionalization; economic freedoms; norms, values, and beliefs; and elections. These are 
analyzed in each case and compared to the nation's decision to join the MTCR. 
The fmdings are that democracy, due to the effect of the independent variables, 
influenced and induced Brazil to join the MTCR; in contrast, the lack of democracy in China 
inhibits that country from joining. Brazil joined because of public desires for economic and 
material aid. These pressured the leadership to adhere, thus making the regime more effective. 
Therefore, the efforts to persuade China to join the MTCR might not succeed until it establishes 
democracy (including all four variables). This fmding suggests that the U.S. National Security 
policy of "engagement and enlargement" is appropriate. 
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Since the end of the Cold War, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have 
assumed prominence as the most serious threat against the United States. In particular, ballistic missiles 
and other unmanned delivery systems are regarded with concern due to the ability of any entity, from 
nation-state to terrorist group, to obtain, deploy and use missiles to attack or threaten the United States 
or its allies. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an international effort, among twenty-
eight democratic countries, to restrict the proliferation of missiles and missile-related technology, 
accomplished by "supply-side" export controls. In relation to missile technology, each member polices 
its own commitments, laws, and exports. 
This thesis provides two representative case studies in membership/non-membership, Brazil 
(membership) and China (non-membership), to assess what role democracy plays in the decision of states 
to join the Missile Technology Control Regime. This study emphasizes that democracy is not only 
important in a nation's membership in the regime; this thesis postulates that it is a requirement. Four 
variables are used to investigate this hypothesis: (1) the impact of economic stability and freedom; (2) 
governance (i.e., governmental institutions, bureaucracy, rule of law, parties); (3) democratic norms, 
beliefs, and values; and ( 4) elections. 
The thesis found that democracy is a necessary condition for states to join the MTCR, due to the 
effect of these four democratic independent variables. This conclusion is because the four variables, 
combined with export controls, had more of a non-proliferant impact than with export controls alone on 
a non-democratic nation. 
XI 
In the Brazilian case, the conclusion was that the effect of the democratic independent variables, 
combined with external export controls, had more of a non-proliferant impact than with export controls 
alone. This is because the four independent variables working together enhanced the effect of the export 
controls by pressuring the newly-elected civilian leadership through the economic policies and through 
the effect of democratic norms, events, structures and pathways. Thus, the four independent variables 
facilitated membership in the regime. 
In addition, the population's desires for economic growth, improved social conditions, cutting of 
federal spending, privatization, and public sector reform had more of an impact than the other variables. 
This is because they influenced the leadership toward membership in the MTCR during the crucial 
electoral process. This pressure occurred through the democratic pathways and structures, and political 
institutionalization of democratic governance, and forced the change in the civilian leadership concerning 
proliferation. 
In the China case, domestic and international factors (need for legitimacy; the PLA; extra-
governmental businesses that circumvent adherence; Taiwan; desire for resources; and the desire for 
strategic international and regional influence and stability) favoring non-adherence and non-membership 
currently influence the PRC's decision to adhere and become a member. In China, the strengthening of 
the four independent variables (economic stability and freedom; governance; democratic norms, beliefs, 
and values; and elections), which by definition equate to democracy, would minimize the factors working 
against membership in the MTCR. 
In China, exports would be controlled or policed by rule of law and proper governance. A 
stronger economy would lessen the impact and need for missile transfers for economic reasons, halting 
PLA and other Ministries' sales. Elections would legitimize the leadership, resolving their need to 
Xll 
export for nationalist reasons. The benefit of democratic peace would lessen tensions with border states 
and the United States and curtail the need for technology transfers to offset rivals. This is because the 
democratic peace is a resultant of a country's acceptance and institutionalization of democratic ideals of 
self-government, rule of law, and democratic representation of the people. These ideas would curtail 
aggressive militaristic actions by inducing a questioning authority to counter the leadership. The PLA 
would decrease authoritarianism in government with democratic institutionalism. Without the combined 
effect of these variables, democracy would not occur; and by extension without these variables, 
membership/adherence in the MTCR will not occur. 
In contrasting the two case studies, the thesis concludes that the establishing of democracy was a 
necessary condition for Brazil to join the MTCR. In the Chinese case, the lack of democracy hinders 
China's ability to join the MTCR. 
Based upon my findings, the current U.S. policy of democratic "engagement and enlargement" is 
therefore the right policy to get other technologically advanced nations to join the regime. It engages the 
non-democratic nations to become broadly democratic, while never allowing problem issues (arms 
control, human rights) to poison relations with the United States. Instead, the policy of engagement and 
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The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is the most serious 
threat the United States faces, according to Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen. 1 
Potential WMD delivery systems are treated just as seriously by the United States and its 
allies. 2 In particular, ballistic missiles are viewed with concern due to the ability of any 
entity, from nation-state to terrorist group, to obtain, deploy and use missiles to attack or 
threaten the United States or its allies. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
is an international effort to deny the spread of these delivery systems to potentially 
irresponsible groups. 
The MTCR is neither a treaty nor an international agreement; it is a voluntary 
arrangement among (currently) twenty-eight democratic countries that share a common 
interest in restricting the proliferation of missiles, unmanned air vehicles, and related 
technology for those systems capable of delivering of a weapon of mass destruction.3 The 
1 Clifford Krauss, "G.O.P.'s Cohen Confirmed To Run Defense Department," New York Times, 
January 23, 1997, p. A10. 
2 U.S. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (East Asia and 
Pacific Region), United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Office oflnternational Security Affairs, 1995, p. 20. 
3 Current members are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, The Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The original intent of the regime, as stated at its 
inception in 1987, was to limit the spread of unmanned nuclear delivery systems, using restrictions on any 
system capable of carrying any 500 kilogram payload (conventional warhead included), greater than or 
equal to 300 kilometers (or in the case of a weapon of mass destruction, any distance and any weight). 
This was modified in January 1993 by expanding the goal of the regime to stemming the proliferation of 
all Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) unmanned delivery systems. The restrictions also extend to any 
system capable of trading off one restriction for the other. This means that even if a system is under one 
restriction, if it is able to be modified by lowering its range or weight and thereby meet or exceed the 
1 
MTCR seeks to curb missile proliferation through a "supply-side" approach, controlling 
the transfers of missiles, unmanned air vehicles, and missile-related technologies, in 
accordance with common guidelines and a technology annex.4 Due to its voluntary 
nature, the regime possesses no overarching verification process, 5 with each member 
policing its own commitments in accordance with its own export laws. 6 
This thesis assesses the role democracy plays in the decision of states to join the 
Missile Technology Control Regime. In order to analyze this problem, I divide the 
concept of "democracy" into several constituent parts: (1) economic liberty; (2) 
restriction, it is still controlled. See U.S. Arms Control and Disannament Agency, "The Missile 
Technology Control Regime," http://www.acda.gov/factshee/exptcon/mtcr96.htm, November 6, 1996; and 
Peter van Ham, Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s: Power. Politics and Policies, New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994, pp. 24-25; Deborah A. Ozga, "A Chronology of the 
Missile Technology Control Regime," The Nonproliferation Review (Winter 1994), p. 67. 
4 One of the difficulties of their control is the interchangeability of missile technology with space 
launch systems technology. The MTCR is not designed to impede national space programs of 
international cooperation in such programs as long as such programs do not contribute to delivery systems 
for WMD. See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR) Guidelines & Equipment & Technology Annex, Washington, D.C.: June 11, 1996, p. l. 
5 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "The Missile Technology Control Regime," 
http://www.acda.gov/factshee/exptcon/mtcr96.htm, November 6, 1996. 
6 The regime delineates the export controls applying to two categories. Category I regulations are 
those that limit the proliferation of complete, whole missile systems, as well as, major subsystems of the 
equipment and technology (including technical data and assistance, design, and production capability for 
complete rocket and missile systems and complete subsystems of rocket stages, reentry vehicles, warhead 
firing mechanisms, and guidance and control systems). Category I items are given a strong presumption 
of denial for export, and are therefore rarely accorded licensing for export. Category II regulations control 
other missile-related components, less sensitive materials that are generally considered dual-use 
components which can have applications in civilian space-launch systems and aircraft. These items can 
be licensed for export to other nations as long as they are not destined for an end-use that could contribute 
to development of a missile within the limitations of the regime. Janne E. Nolan, "Alternative 
Approaches to Managing Missile Proliferation," The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' 
Network, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 281-83; U.S. Arms Control and Disannament 
Agency, "The Missile Technology Control Regime;" W. Seth Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third 
World: Threat and Response, London: Praeger Publishers, 1990, p. 89; and Center for International 
Security and Arms Control, Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Its Control, Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University, 1991, p. 119. 
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democratic governance and rule oflaw; (3) democratic norms, beliefs, and values; and (4) 
elections. 
The answer to this question is important in determining which democratic factors 
are most relevant to an applicant's desire for, and acceptance into membership; as well as, 
being applicable to all prior cases of membership in the MTCR. These factors provide the 
basis for policy recommendations to the United States and other MTCR members, with 
regard to states which are desired by the United States or other regime members to join 
the MTCR, or for those states who possess a desire to join of their own accord. 
A. THESIS HYPOTHESIS 
The thesis hypothesis is that democracy is a necessary but insufficient factor for 
states to join the MTCR. In other words, without democracy a state is not likely to join 
the MTCR. The exact definition of democracy, and the linkages that must be created for 
it to exist, are crucially important. Democracy would not exist without economic 
freedom, democratic governance and rule of law (i.e., relatively stable domestic situation, 
institutions, bureaucracy, judiciary, and political parties), appropriate democratic norms, 
beliefs, and values (i.e., personal relationships, learning, motivations, and ideology), and 
elections (i.e., accountability of the leadership to the people). It is by meeting these 
criteria for democracy that a nation will be inclined toward becoming a member of the 
regime. 
Additionally, in relation to each other, the factors of economic liberty, and norms, 
beliefs, and values, have the strongest relative effect on a nation to join the regime, 
followed by the factor of elections, and lastly, the importance of democratic governance 
3 
and rule of law. The stronger relative importance of economic freedom, and norms, 
beliefs, and values, is due to their impact on the civilian democratic government to force 
change. These factors pressure the leadership to adhere to nonproliferation and the 
regime. This popular pressure from the people for change is then felt through elections by 
the action of proper governance (i.e., actions of the parties, the government institutions, 
the judiciary, and bureaucracy). These causal relationships explain the secondary 
importance of these last two factors. 
B. THESIS METHODOLOGY 
1. Thesis method and case studies 
The thesis utilizes the "structured focused comparison method" to compare the 
missile policies of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the People's Republic of China. 
7 
Brazil and China are selected for study primarily because of their differences in 
membership in the MTCR. Brazil joined the regime in October 1995. China has not 
joined, however supposedly adheres to the regime. China's adherence is questionable, due 
to its sporadic non-compliance with the regime's full restrictions. The dichotomous nature 
ofthe cases (Brazil's membership versus China's non-membership) is further exemplified 
with Brazil's ongoing consolidation of democracy as opposed to China's sub-democratic 
level of liberalization. 
7 For the rest of the thesis, the Federative Republic of Brazil will be stated as Brazil, and the 
People's Republic of China as China or the PRC. Any discussion of the Republic of China will be written 
as Taiwan or the ROC. 
4 
In addition to these comparative benefits with regard to membership, both nations' 
similar abilities to strategically and militarily eclipse the geographic regions in which they 
reside serve to additionally promote their selections as case studies. 8 Similarly, in an 
economic sense, Brazil and China are both eagerly sought by the developed world for their 
potential markets; as well as, being known for their technological ability to produce and 
sell rugged, cheap, and simple arms. Politically, both nations desire a greater influence in 
the world arena. Brazil's desire for greater international influence manifests itself through 
its desire for a United Nations' Security Council seat, as well as a desire to be seen as a 
responsible world power. China's desire for international influence is seen through its 
actions on the world stage, in the United Nations, partly as a result of its impending 
growth into a regional and Great Power. In addition, both nations are emerging from 
similar periods of harsh authoritarian government. Brazil emerged in 1985 from military 
rule. China emerged in 1977 from the lasting effects of the Cultural Revolution, but is still 
under Communist rule. 
8 Both nations possess large populations with extensive poverty. Brazil has an estimated 
158,740,000 total population, the fifth most populous nation, with an estimated 20 percent in poverty and 
another 20 percent barely subsisting. China has an estimated 1,190,430,000 total population, the most in 
the world, and approximately 30 percent in poverty. China and Brazil are nearly the same size (Brazil: 
3,286,470 square miles; and China: 3,691,502 square miles), possessing large amounts of natural 
resources. Brazil possesses vast mineral wealth including iron, quartz, coal, manganese, chromium, 
industrial diamonds, uranium, and platinum; as well as the ecological resource of the Amazonian rain 
forest. China possesses an abundance of hydroelectric power, large amounts of coal, petroleum, extensive 
deposits of iron, tungsten, tin, mercury, magnetite, aluminum, salt, uranium, gold, and zinc. See "Brazil 
Social Conditions," Political Risk Services CD Rom Database. Syracuse, New York: International 
Business Communications USA, Inc., 1996; Concise Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994; "How Poor Is China?," The Economist October 1996, pp. 35-37. 
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2. Thesis structure and organization 
The following two chapters present the two case studies, Brazil and China. In 
each chapter, the various dimensions of democracy are analyzed as is the country's missile 
programs and policies, investigating for the influence of the four democratic constituents 
on membership. The fourth and final chapter presents the democratic factors that were 
found to be most relevant in the case studies. The last chapter recommends policy for the 
United States, to induce non-members to join the MTCR. 
Prior to exploring the case studies, a brief section is required to examine, define 
and clarify the four constituents (economic freedom; proper governance and rule of law; 
norms, beliefs, and values; and elections) which define democracy for the purpose of this 
thesis. 9 The clarification and defining of these four constituent parts is crucial because 
they create the theoretical framework for the thesis. It is this framework that is used to 
investigate the relationships between democracy and a nation's decision to join the Missile 
Technology Control Regime in the case studies. 
9 As opposed to factors that make up the actual transition to democracy, the importance of elites, 
or other factors that make democracy sustainable. See Guillermo O'Donnell, and Philippe C. Schmitter, 
Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993; Jorge I. Dominguez, and Abraham F. Lowenthal, editors, 
Constructing Democratic Governance: South America in the 1990s, Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1996; Adam Przeworski, editor, Sustainable Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995; Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, editors, Politics in 
Developing Countries: Comparing Exoeriences With Democracy, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1995; Roderic Ai Camp, editor, Democracy in Latin America: Patterns and Cvcles, 
Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1996; John Higley, and Richard Gunther, editors, Elites and 
Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992; Dankhart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," Comparative 
Politics, Volume 2, April1970, p. 357; Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative 
Exploration, New Haven, MA: Yale University Press, 1977, p. 103; Larry Diamond, "Introduction: 
Political Culture and Democracy," Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994. 
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C. THEORY 
1. Factors defining democracy 
The theoretical framework used m this thesis constitutes four independent 
variables that in combination are incorporated from the theoretical literature on 
democracy. A combined approach is required because the existing theories create an 
incomplete picture of what makes up democracy, when used individually. The exclusive 
use of one constituent of democracy would also make it difficult to specify the exact 
linkages between democracy and membership. This difficulty is due to the fact that the 
individual theoretical perspectives identify different factors (independent variables) of what 
makes up democracy. As a result, focusing on one constituent of democracy would 
therefore limit this investigation as to why states join the MTCR (the dependent variable). 
The purpose of this section is to define the four constituents and the dependent variable, 
as well as build the theoretical framework used for this research. 
a. Electoral democracy 
The factor of elections can be attributed to minimalist definitions of 
democracy, namely Joseph Schumpeter's concept of democracy. His construct defined 
elections as the essence of democracy; a system "for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people's vote." 10 This definition of elections is used in this research. 
10 This minimalist perspective can also be defined as "electoral democracy." See Larry Diamond, 
"Is the Third Wave Over?," Journal ofDemocracy, Volume 7, Number 3, July 1996, p. 21. 
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b. Governance 
The second factor of democratic institutions promote the ideals of political 
rights and civil liberties, or as defined elsewhere, "liberal democracy."11 This concept of 
democracy requires not only extensive "minimalist" political competition and participation 
but also substantial levels of freedom and pluralism that enable people to form and express 
their political preferences. 12 The concept of democratic "governance" builds on this to 
include the ideals of a rule of law. 
Governance is described as a situation m which civil liberties are 
guaranteed by law; government is representative, accountable and powerful; bureaucracy 
is rational, rule-bound, merit-based, and subject to control by elected officials (so it is 
accountable to the people); and the government ensures some dispersal of economic 
resources. 13 Governance also specifies civilian control of the military in which the military 
is subordinated to the popularly-elected civilian leadership. 14 This thesis utilizes the 
11 The most influential definition of liberal democracy is Robert Dahl's concept of "polyarchy". 
See Larry Diamond, p. 21; and Shannon Mattiace, and Roderic Ai Camp, "Democracy and Development: 
An Overview," Democracy in Latin America: Patterns and Cvcles, Roderic Ai Camp, editor, Wilmington, 
DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1996, p. 6. Freedom House in its comparative surveys define the term 
"electoral democracy" as "partly free democracies," referring to democracies that are democratic in form 
but less in substance, meaning political rights and civil liberties; other names used have been "semi-
democratic" or "formal democracy." See http://www.freedomhouse.org/Political/method.htm. 
12 These ideas are stated in Dahl's eight requirements for democracy: freedom to form and join 
organizations; freedom of expression; right to vote; right of political leaders to compete for support; 
alternative sources of information; eligibility for public office; free and fair elections; and institutions for 
making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference. See Robert A. Dahl, 
Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971, p. 3. 
13 The concept of"govemance" is from Valerie Bunce's concept of the democracy. See Shannon 
Mattiace, and Roderic Ai Camp, "Democracy and Development: An Overview," Democracy in Latin 
America: Patterns and Cvcles, p. 6. 
14 One can argue that this might deserve to be a separate variable, however, by incorporating the 
concepts of institutional democracy, rule of law, bureaucracy, and parties into governance. This should 
8 
concept of governance (with the rule of law, and appropriate democratic rights, liberties, 
structures, and institutions) to describe the second facet of democracy. 
c. Political Culture 
The concept of values, norms, and beliefs is the third facet of democracy. 
These three ideas (also referred to as a nation's "political culture"), are used to describe 
the public's predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations 
about the political system of their country, and the role of the self in that system, their 
inclination toward political action and their political system in general. 15 The linkage 
between these values, beliefs, and norms, and the concept of democracy is that the 
political culture of a state matters, and can influence the political structures, coalitions, 
political behavior, policy, and development of the country. 16 This definition of political 
culture is utilized for the third facet of democracy. 
cover proper civilian control over the military. Terry Lynn Karl's idea of the importance of proper 
civilian -military relations. Ibid. 
15 Some of the earliest descriptions of this normative approach to the structure of democracy 
originate with Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. They summarized these three factors into three 
orientations: a cognitive orientation, involving knowledge of and beliefs of the system; an affective 
orientation, feelings about the system; and an evaluational orientation, commitments to political values 
and judgments about the performance of the system relative to those values. See Gabriel A. Almond, and 
Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 15; and Larry Diamond, "Introduction: Political Culture and 
Democracy," Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
1994, p. 8. 
16 This is due to effect of the leadership remaining constant to, and abiding by these causal legal 
and public norms. In turn, the leadership receive legality and legitimacy (other forms of norms, values, 
and beliefs), thereby strengthening democracy. Thus, leaders, while abiding by this political culture, 
strengthens the culture and the institution of democracy itself. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public 
Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," World Politics, Volume 43, 
July 1991, pp. 510-12; and Yossi Shain, and Juan J. Linz, "The Role oflnterim Governments," Journal of 
Democracv, Volume 3, Number 1, January 1992, p. 74. Another example of the effect of norms, values, 
and beliefs (in addition to governance) is the democratic peace; the belief that democratic states do not 
fight each other. This outcome of democratic norms, values, and beliefs is plausible based on the 
underlying principle of democracy, that disputes can be resolved without force through democratic 
political processes that in some balance ensure both majority rule and minority rule without violence or 
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d. Economic freedom and influences 
The fourth facet of democracy is the importance of economic freedom. 
This means that democracy has been made possible by a certain level of economic freedom 
and development, 17 and without which democracy would not be stable and would falter.
18 
The theoretical structure of this concept is assumed by the relationship of growing wealth 
to democracy. This economic theory of democracy specifies that as wealth increases, it is 
accompanied by increased education, graduated autonomy in business and some 
government institutions. The improvements in institutions (governance), wealth, and 
education foster the growth of democratic attitudes (political culture). It is this growth in 
political culture that fosters and nourishes democracy. 19 The thesis utilizes this definition 
of the linkages between economic liberty and democracy for the investigation. 
violation of one's rights. This norm of equality applies across state boundaries toward other democracies, 
since those in one democracy will respect and allow others their own right of self-determination, if they 
are perceived as a democracy. This does not apply to non-democracies. The democratic peace is also 
attributed to the impact of governance or, in other words, the structural and institutional influences in a 
democracy. This factor is due to the constraints that these two variables have on a state's ability to go to 
war, i.e., the difficulty of democratic leaders to move their countries into war due to public opinion, 
bureaucracies, legislatures, and interest groups, who must be persuaded to fight. According to this theory, 
the impact of these factors are accentuated with regard to other democracies in deterring war, which 
means the democratic institutions and political culture moderate the warlike attributes of states. See 
Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 31-33, 38-39, 40-41. 
17 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Centurv, p. 
316. 
18 This level of development has been quantified, suggesting that the transition to stable 
democracy correlates to mean incomes between $5000 and $6000, and becomes indestructible at the 
$7000 level. See Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, 
"What Makes Democracy Endure?," Journal of Democracy, January 1996. 
19 HenryS. Rowen, "The Short March: China's Road to Democracy," The National Interest, 
Number 45, Falll996, pp. 68-69. 
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2. Thesis theoretical framework 
Utilizing the four facets of democracy discussed above, this thesis utilizes four 
independent variables that in combination incorporate the above theories. The 
independent variables are: 
1) the importance of elections, 
2) a nation's governance and rule oflaw, 
3) a nation's political culture (norms, values, and beliefs), 
4) the degree and influence of economic freedom. 
Comparing the impact of each independent variable separately, and together with 
the other variables, allows one to answer the research question: "What role does 
democracy play in the propensity of states to join the Missile Technology Control 
Regime?" 
This causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables IS 





3. DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 
4. ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND LIBERTY 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
NONPROLIFERATION 
BEHAVIOR (I.E., MEMBERSHIP 
INTHEMTCR) 
Figure 1. Causal relationship between democracy and nonproliferation behavior. 
In addition to the necessity of all four independent variables for membership, the 
relative importance of each is also relevant, for it is this relative importance that can be 
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used to focus and target national policy guidelines, enabling the United States to influence 
a nation's membership. The factors of economic freedom and political culture have the 
strongest relative effect in a democracy. These causal variables have the strongest effect 
due to the direct influence of the two variables on the civilian leadership, especially during 
elections. This causation is a result of the fact that the leadership can be voted from office 
if their policies do not adhere to the desires of the people. This influence of the people 
through elections is made known to the leadership and facilitated through the 
institutionalization of governance. 
Therefore, the primary causal independent variables apply pressure to the 
leadership through the execution of the secondary independent variable, open and free 
elections. The pathways through which the pressure is applied and through which the 
elections are held (the government institutions and political parties) are the tertiary 
independent variables. Additionally, proper national adherence to the resultant laws or 
policies is achieved through the influence of the rule of law, and the civilian-led 
government institutions that are charged with carrying out those policies. 
These relationships can be seen in Figure 2. 
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PRIMARY CAUSAL TERTIARY SECONDARY TERTIARY DEPENDENT 
INDEPENDENT INDEPENDENT INDEPENDENT INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
VARIABLES: VARIABLE: VARIABLE: VARIABLE: 
Political Culture Elections Nonproliferation 
Economic liberty (i.e., change (i.e., adherence 
(i.e., desires Governance in policy) Governance & membership 
of the people) & rule of law & rule of law in theMTCR) 
(i.e., bureaucracy, (i.e., bureaucracy, 
parties, & parties, & 
institutions) institutions) 
Figure 2. Causal relationships between independent variables. 
In the above diagrams, it is assumed that the dependent variable is 
nonproliferation/membership in MTCR. To clarify the opposing degree of membership in 
the case studies, though, the exact definition of the dependent variable needs to be refined, 
just as the independent variables were delineated. The dependent variable is defined as the 
propensity of states to join the Missile Technology Control Regime. 2° For the purposes of 
this thesis, the concept of "joining" the MTCR revolves around the idea of membership. 
This idea of membership includes: those states that either joined at the inception of the 
regime, or later submitted applications that were approved for membership. Further, for 
the purpose of this research, a nation that has "joined" will include those nations that have 
undergone the recruitment process, aligned their indigenous export policies to those 
specified in the MTCR, effectively enforced these export laws to the satisfaction of the 
20 The actual member states, who were cited earlier, are those that have either joined the regime 
at inception in 1987 (the Group of Seven nations), later submitted applications that were approved for 
membership, or were directly recruited by the regime for inclusion. Official adherents are those that are 
not official members but have signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States to adhere, 
these include: Ukraine, People's Republic of China, and Israel. Unofficial adherents are those nations that 
have stated their desire to abide by the regime, for example, Pakistan. See Deborah A. Ozga, "A 
Chronology of the Missile Technology Control Regime;" and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
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regime, and effectively curtailed any proliferation that is controlled by the limits of the 
regtme. 
The importance of including those who have fully abided by the regime's 
regulations in their actions but have not been "officially" inducted as a member is pertinent 
when investigating those nations which have been stated as "official adherents" (i.e., 
Israel, People's Republic of China and Ukraine), or which have declared on their own to 
be "adherents" (i.e., Pakistan), but do not abide by the regime's full restrictions (i.e., 
People's Republic of China and Ukraine). This delineation between those nations who 
have fully complied, and those who have not, enables the research to clarify which nation 
is interested in joining, and which is not. Finally, this "stretching" of the actual definition 
of "joining" the MTCR, enables one to investigate a possible situation where a prospective 
member has fully complied with the regime (in written laws and actions) but whose full 
acceptance as a member has been held up for political or economic reasons by an already 
sitting full member, or by another prospective member. 
3. Thesis hypothesis revisited with regard to factors defining democracy 
The purpose of this section is to revise and clarify the thesis hypothesis, that 
"without democracy a state is not liable to be a MTCR member," by including the four 
democratic independent variables. This is necessary to explain the causal nature of each of 
these four variables on the dependent variable, membership in the regime. 
The influence of political culture is crucial to membership. The needs and desires 
of the people for economic assistance and for international respect and recognition for 
Agency, "The Missile Technology Control Regime," http://www.acda.gov/factshee/exptcon/mtcr96.htm, 
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their country are the causal factors that move the civilian leadership in a certain policy 
direction. The public's desires are expressed to the leadership only if the people believe in 
democracy. This is because it is only through their participation and belief in their own 
representation in government that the civilian leadership will respond to their needs. 
Thus, the values, beliefs, and norms of the population positively influence a nation's 
membership in the regime through the electorate's actions. 21 
Economic liberty, freedom and openness is also crucial to membership. The 
impact of economic freedom lessens the economic impact of a halt to missile proliferation, 
and impacts on the leadership through the desires of the people for improved economic 
and material conditions. This is because economic freedom and openness diversify the 
marketplace, which in turn lessen the economic need for proliferation. In addition, the 
economy provides linkages between internal actors, and from internal actors to external 
actors through the economy's requirement for availability for information, technology, 
loans, and international trade. This requirement for information promotes the strength of 
democracy, and positively influences membership in the MTCR (by allowing current 
members to check on the ability of the prospective member to curtail proliferation, and 
allowing the government to police itself according to its own indigenous export laws). 
The need for international technology, loans and trade, additionally, provides an incentive 
November 6, 1996. 
21 The positive nature of the relationship versus a negative causal relationship is due to the 
impact of economic pressures on the population. In a democracy, the mass of the people favor 
government assistance to the needy and equality to all citizens. This manifests itself in less desire by the 
people for government-sponsored companies and proliferation, which results in a sensitivity by the 
leadership to nonproliferation and economic issues. 
15 
for nonproliferation_ This incentive is due to the leverage that these factors give to 
nonproliferating nations, when denying their access to proliferating nations. 
The influence of governance is also crucial to membership. Democracy's basis of 
governance positively influences the applicability and effectiveness of the legal structures 
for self-policing of indigenous export laws that are required for membership. The 
pressures of the population are also carried through these institutions, bureaucracies and 
parties to influence the leadership in a positive direction with regard to membership, and 
thus serve as "democratic pathways" for the desires of the people. 
The necessity of elections in a democracy is also crucial to a nation's membership 
in the regime_ This necessity is due to the fact that the civilian leadership is desirous of 
legitimacy and re-election. This legitimacy and continued mandate is gained through 
political stability, respected international standing, and continued economic growth, in 
accordance with the people's desires. These factors are positively enhanced through a 
nation's membership in the MTCR Membership fulfills these needs of the civilian leader, 
through international prestige, access to development loans and assistance for economic 
growth. 
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II. CASE STUDY: BRAZIL 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the influence of democracy on Brazil's 
decision to become a member of the MTCR. The chapter begins by investigating the 
recent re-emergence ofBrazilian democracy, as well as the history ofBrazil's membership 
in the MTCR. Following these two sections, the impact of the four independent variables 
are analyzed with regard to the decision to become a member. The chapter concludes that 
pressure on the newly-elected, and receptive, civilian leadership led to membership in the 
regime. This pressure came indirectly from the citizens, through the electorate's mandate 
for economic improvement, improved domestic conditions, and privatization. The 
people's mandate expressed through their electoral voting for national leader and platform 
induced the leadership to join the regime. These popular views were channeled through 
the institutions and parties. 22 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. History of democracy in Brazil 
Since 1985 Brazil has undergone a period of re-democratization. The military 
government (1964-1985) lost legitimacy in part because of its failure to maintain economic 
22 This domestic pressure resulted from citizen participation in the democracy, taking the fonn of 
citizen demands for economic assistance, and an improved international standing. These could only be 
easily achieved through nonproliferation. The economic desires were combined with an equal desire by 
the population and leadership for citizen control of the government and military. This desire for proper 
civil-military relations manifested itself through a curtailing of government development of nuclear and 
non-nuclear weapons. The effect of the citizen desires were transmitted and the military subordinated 
through the efforts of political parties and democratic institutions. 
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growth. The liberalization process began in 1974, through the processes of "distensao" 
(decompression of authoritarian rule) and later through "abertura" (political opening)_23 
The re-democratization process was solidified with the complete transition of power to a 
civilian, popularly-elected government in 1989, when Fernando Collar de Mello won the 
first direct presidential election in Brazil in 29 years. 24 
The democratic process was further tested and refined in 1992 with the 
impeachment and resignation of President Collar, 25 and the subsequent transfer of power 
to Vice President Itamar Franco. This legitimate and democratic transition illustrates the 
strength of its 1988 Constitution, the legislature and bureaucracy, as well as Brazilian rule 
of law. The second direct presidential election occurred in 1994. This resulted in the 
victory of current president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who was inaugurated in January 
199 5 ?6 The current political system exists in accordance with the Constitution, with 
23 Ronald M. Schneider, Brazil: Culture and Politics in a New Industrial Powerhouse, Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1996, p. 95. 
24 In the 1989 elections, the political climate was marked by economic deterioration, near 
hyperinflation, and an erosion of political legitimacy and credibility. President Collor ran on a platform 
of market-oriented liberalism tempered with moderate social democratic principles. The main opposition 
candidate, who won enough votes in the first round of elections to compete in the second round, was Luis 
Inacio Lula da Silva, from the Workers' Party. He ran on a leftist platform of economic, social, and 
political equality. Lula's party was based on a nationalist, socialist platform, aimed to eradicate all 
privileges and eradicate capitalism. In the first round Collor won 28.5 percent to Lula's 16.1 percent, in 
the second, Collor won the Presidency with 50 percent, to Lula's 44.2 percent. See "What is the PT, the 
Workers' Party of Brazil?," http://www.pt.org.br/what.htm#platform; Scott Mainwaring, "Brazil: Weak 
Parties, Feckless Democracy," Building Democratic Institutions: Partv Systems in Latin America, 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995, p. 373; Ronald M. Schneider, Brazil: Culture and Politics 
in a New Industrial Powerhouse, pp. 114-15. 
25 This impeachment was due to charges of corruption. 
26 Cardoso won the Presidency on October 4, 1994 by winning 54.3 percent of the vote, to Luis 
Inacio Lula da Silva's 27 percent of the vote. Cardoso ran on a platform of economic liberalism, 
monetary stabilization, and market-oriented reforms. Lula presented a leftist nationalist platform, 
favoring economic, social, and political equality. See "Elections In Brazil," 
http://www.universal.nl/users/derksen/electionlbrazil.htm; and Bolivar Lamounier, "Brazil: Inequality 
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separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and the existence of dozens of 
political parties. 27 The question that interests us is whether, and to what extent, 
democracy in Brazil influenced the country's desire to join the MTCR. 
2. History of Brazil's membership in the MTCR 
The history of Brazil's MTCR membership originates with international pressures 
brought to bear on the military governments and the Jose Samey administration (1985-
1990).28 Those pressures peaked against the Collor administration following the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. This pressure was due to concerns regarding the presence of a 
Brazilian company in Iraq assisting in the Iraqi missile program. 29 This international 
interest was especially acute because the owner of the company was a retired Brazilian Air 
Force Major General, Hugo de Oliveira Piva. Some accused Piva of transferring sensitive 
Brazilian technology to Iraq. The missile technology had been developed with Brazilian 
taxpayer money, and transferred without official permission. This transfer was especially 
Against Democracy," Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995, p. 163. 
27 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "Background Notes: Brazil," March 1995, 
gopher:/ /dosfan.lib. uic.edu:70/0F-1 %3A22622%3ABrazil%2C%203/95. 
28 Sarney was the civilian Vice President who assumed the Presidency after President-elect 
Tancredo Neves passed away. He therefore was not directly elected by the people and did not possess the 
mandate or full legitimacy that Neves had enjoyed. 
29 This company, HOP Industries, was assisting the Iraqis to increase the range of their 
indigenous Scud missiles, from 270 kilometers to 600 kilometers. In addition, the company was also 
working in Iraq to produce a version of the Piranha air -to-air missile. See "Extending Missile Range," 
EFE (Madrid) February 6, 1991, http://cns.miis.edu/cgi-bin/cnsdatalabstracts.cgi; "PIRANHA-TYPE 
Missile Technology," VEJA (Sao Paulo), May 16, 1990, http://cns.miis.edu/cgi-bin/cnsdata/abstracts.cgi, 
p. 53; and "Firm 'May Have' Sold Missile Technology To Iraq," Rede Globo Television (Rio De Janeiro), 
January 3, 1992, http://cns.miis.edu/cgi-bin/cnsdata/abstracts.cgi. 
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important because even without authorization, it was still perfectly legal. 30 The 
international pressure came in the form of a placement of export controls against Brazil. 
These controls limited space launch and other missile-relevant advanced technologies, 
technical expertise, and overseas investment. 31 
As a result of the international pressure and the domestic concern from the press, 
the electorate, and the Congress, President Collar was prompted to propose legislation 
against such transfers. This legislation proposed government control over the export of 
dual-use services by citizens and private companies. 32 The initial legislation, known as the 
Piva Law, was approved in 1991. It effectively closed the loophole utilized by Piva. 
Further pressure from other countries, particularly the United States, to halt 
continued technology transfers to Brazil, resulted in an additional export control bill being 
introduced in the Brazilian legislature in February 1992. This was halted, though, with the 
3
° Clifford P. Graham. "The Technological Imperative: A Brazilian Perspective on Dual-Use 
Technology," Gary K. Bertsch, RichardT. Cupitt, and Steven Elliot-Gower, editors, International 
Cooperation on Nonproliferation Exoort Controls: Prospects for the 1990s and Beyond, Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1994, p. 235-36. 
31 Despite these controls, in 1989 France strongly considered exporting rocket motor technology 
to Brazil, along with the dispatch of rocket experts to assist in production. The sale was only halted after 
U.S. pressure. In August 1990 the U.S. then seemingly violated the controls by allowing the re-export of 
seven Brazilian rocket motor casings. These had been previously shipped to the United States for thermal 
treatment, and were allowed after a review of their export license in terms of MfCR compliance in May 
1990. See U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Heat Treatment of Brazilian Rocket Motors," Washington, 
D.C.: December 24, 1990, http://cns.miis.edu/cgi-bin/cnsdata/abstracts.cgi; "Ministry States Policy," Le 
Ouotidien De Paris, October 7-8, 1990, p. 14, http://cns.miis.edu/cgi-bin/cnsdata/abstracts.cgi; Michael R. 
Gordon, "U.S. Tries To Stop Brazil's Missile Technology Deal," New York Times, October 19, 1989, p. 
A6, http://cns.rniis.edu/cgi-bin/cnsdata/abstracts.cgi; "U.S. Release Of Rocket Motor Casings Reported," 
0 Estado De Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo), September 8, 1990, p. 9, http://cns.rniis.edu/cgi-
bin/cnsdata/abstracts.cgi; and Deborah A. Ozga, "A Chronology of the Missile Technology Control 
Regime," The Nonproliferation Review (Winter 1994), http://cns.miis.edu/db/msUchrono/mtcr.m4. 
32 Patrice Franko-Jones, The Brazilian Defense Industrv. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1992, p. 4; and Ronald M. Schneider, Brazil: Culture and Politics in a New Industrial Powerhouse. 
Boulder, Westview Press, 1996, p. 114-15. 
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impeachment of President Collor in the spring of 1992. It is important to note that the 
halting of the transfer of Brazilian sensitive technology to Iraq was especially remarkable. 
This is because this last severing of trade resulted in the virtual collapse of the Brazilian 
company ofENGESA, which had been stumbling since 1988 and the end ofthe Iran-Iraq 
war. AVIBRAS was also hurt. 
In February 1994, in keeping with his predecessor's legacy, President Franco 
began addressing international and existing MTCR member concerns about civilian 
controls. This began with the establishment of the Agencia Espacial Brasileira (AEB -
Brazilian Space Agency). It instituted civilian control ofthe space program, and replaced 
the military-controlled Comissao Brasileira de Atividades Espaciais (COBAE - Brazilian 
Commission of Space Activities). The AEB is responsible for the coordination of all 
ministries involved in the Missao Espacial Completa Brazileira (MECB - Brazilian 
Complete Space Mission).33 President Franco additionally announced Brazil would abide 
by the MTCR. He stated that Brazil's intention was to join in the regime in the future, for 
the purpose of getting access to banned advanced technology?
4 This was underlined by 
33 Jayroe Brener and Antonio Novaes, "Space Agency Head On US Proliferation Concerns, 
MTCR," lsto E. March 13, 1994, p. 75; and Jose Monserrat Filho, "The new Brazilian Space Agency: a 
political and legal analysis," Space Policy, May 1995, p. 125. 
34 The access to the banned technology (i.e., vehicle guidance systems, propulsion, sensors, 
special materials, electronics, and computers items) was imperative for Brazil to develop its own 
indigenous satellite launch vehicle (VLS), and for the establishment of a spaceport near the equator at 
Alcantara. This desire for a Brazilian launch vehicle was important for economic reasons, to partake of 
international space launch business, as well as associated development benefits. Therefore, the country 
couldn't get required imports without giving up its missile exports and technology transfers. The answer 
was to adhere to the regime. It has been proposed that the required technologies would reduce the cost of 
the VLS by 30 percent, equating the cost to as little as $7 million per launch. To further illustrate this, 
the United States had already allowed technology transfers to Spain, Australia, and Italy since they were 
members of the MTCR, and it could be expected to do the same with Brazil, once it became a member. 
See Ian Simpson, "Brazil To Meet Standards On Missile Technology," Reuter. February 11, 1994; Wyn 
Bowen and Andrew Koch, "Non-Proliferation Is Embraced by Brazil," Jane's Intelligence Review, 
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Brazil's decision in December 1994 to control trade in missile-related goods and services 
in conjunction with existing laws and mechanisms. 35 These controls simply awaited the 
approval of an indigenous export control bill. 36 
In addition to the impact of MTCR export controls, improved relations with 
Argentina assisted to persuade Brazil to adhere to the regime. 37 This improvement in 
relations stemmed from joint nuclear nonproliferation rapprochement. This in tum was 
the result of domestic budgetary concerns and a joint Argentine-Brazilian desire to curb 
indigenous military influence and control. The Argentineans assisted this decision with the 
cessation of their own Condor II ballistic missile program. 
Concurrently, other Brazilian domestic concerns pressured the leadership for 
adherence. This took the form of a pursuit for international legitimacy, manifested in 
Brazil's desire to be a space power. In particular, this desire fueled the need for a space 
Volume 8, Number 6 (June 1996), p. 284; The RISK Report: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
Volume 1, Number 3, April1995, p. 6; and Philip Finnegan, "Foreign Technology May Cut Brazil 
Launch Vehicle Costs," Defense News. March 11-17, 1996, p. 26. 
35 Despite this decision, there is some discussion as to whether Brazil had fully adhered to the 
regime because it was discovered in May 1995 to have received advanced missile technology from Russia 
for the VLS. President Clinton waived the economic sanctions against Russia and Brazil that were 
required by a 1990 United States law. The decision to not levy sanctions was made after Russia "promised 
to stop" sales to Brazil. It was also seen as an effort to encourage Brazil to become a full MTCR member. 
This is interesting since this shows a change in U.S. Government policy, from using sanctions to stop 
proliferation, to waiving these same sanctions to stop proliferation. Despite this apparent change, it has 
been predicted that Brazil's membership and promise of safeguards will not halt proliferation, only retard 
its growth. See Brian G. Chow, Emerging National Space Launch Programs: Economics and Safeguards, 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993, p. 66; R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Waives Objection to Russian Missile 
Technology Sale To Brazil," Washington Post, June 8, 1995, pp. A23, A27; and Warren Foster, "Russia 
Did Not Violate MTCR, Official Says," Space News, June 12-18, 1995, p. 12. 
36 Wyn Bowen and Andrew Koch, "Non-Proliferation Is Embraced by Brazil," Jane's Intelligence 
Review, Volume 8, Number 6 (June 1996), p. 284. 
37 Jose Goldemberg and Harold A. Feiveson, "Denuclearization in Argentina and Brazil," Arms 
Control Today, March 1994, p. 13; and Wyn Bowen and Andrew Koch, "Non-Proliferation Is Embraced 
by Brazil," Jane's Intelligence Review, Volume 8, Number 6 (June 1996), p. 284. 
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launch vehicle, the VLS. This endeavor put pressure on the government to adhere to the 
MTCR, thereby obtaining the crucial technologies. 38 
President Cardoso continued the MTCR membership process, following the 
nation's second presidential election. He stated his commitment to nonproliferation in 
August 1995, proclaiming "Brazil no longer possesses, nor does it produce or intend to 
produce, to import or to export long-range military missiles capable of carrying weapons 
of mass destruction."39 As a result, on October 5, 1995, the Brazilian Senate enacted the 
final measure needed to assure Brazil's adherence to the Missile Technology Control 
Regime. This approval of President Cardoso's Export Control Law #9112, gave the 
Strategic Affairs Secretariat (SAE) authority to penalize firms that breach export controls 
for dual-use technologies. This included missile-related goods and services.40 
As a result of these consistent efforts by Presidents Collor de Mello, Franco, and 
Cardoso in curbing technology transfers, ensuring punishment for violations, and the 
38 In addition to Brazil's desire to be legitimized as a space power, it also possesses a desire for a 
seat on the United Nations Security Council. This manifests itself through its adherence and membership 
to the regime. The belief is that membership will satisfy the requirements for Brazil to be seen as a 
regional power and peacemaker. See Wyn Bowen and Andrew Koch, "Non-Proliferation Is Embraced by 
Brazil," Jane's Intelligence Review, Volume 8, Number 6 (June 1996), p. 284; and Warren Ferster, 
"Brazil Relishes Freedom as MTCR Member," Space News, October 30- November 5, 1995, p. I. 
39 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Space for Peace Not War," Defense News, September 18, 1995, 
p. 32. 
40 The penalties range from warnings and fines to removal of export privileges and 
imprisonment. See Wyn Q. Bowen, "Brazil's Accession to the MTCR," The Nonproliferation Review, 
Spring-Summer 1996, p. 88. In addition to the MTCR, other efforts were enacted: the Mendoza 
Declaration, focusing on chemical and biological weapons; and the Treaty ofTlatelolco, establishing a 
nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean; see Wyn Bowen and Andrew Koch, "Non-
Proliferation Is Embraced by Brazil," pp. 283-87. 
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subordination of Brazil's space program to civilian control, Brazil officially became a 
member ofthe MTCR on October 11, 1995.41 
B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELECTIONS AND MEMBERSHIP IN 
THEMTCR 
The influence of elections on membership in the regime is interesting due to the 
fact that Brazil's initial steps toward membership began with the election of President 
Collor and the re-establishment of civilian government. His election is the single most 
important event associated with Brazil's change of policy toward restrictions on dual-use 
technology.42 His predecessor, Jose Samey, had been indirectly elected president, and was 
less willing to counter the military in its efforts to develop missiles. The factor of elections 
is important because the election victor, President Collor, became a catalyst for movement 
in a nonproliferative direction. 
President Collor induced this movement partly due to the effect of international 
sanctions/export controls. These sanctions stemmed from international pressures for 
nonproliferation to Iraq during the Persian Gulf War.43 President Collor's positive 
response to these international pressures, which were partly accentuated by Brazil's newly 
energized and unsuppressed domestic press, professional groups, and legislature, led to 
41 Wyn Bowen, "Brazil's Accession to the MTCR," p. 88; and "Missile Technology Control 
Regime Holds Plenary Meeting In Bonn," Missile Technology Control Regime, 1995. 
42 Clifford P. Graham. "The Technological Imperative: A Brazilian Perspective on Dual-Use 
Technology," Gary K. Bertsch, RichardT. Cupitt, and Steven Elliot-Gower, editors, International 
Cooperation on Nonproliferation Export Controls: Prosoects for the 1990s and Beyond, Ann Arbor, Ml: 
University of Michigan Press, 1994, p. 233. 
43 Brazil is a traditional purchaser of Brazilian weapons and technology. Ibid. 
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movement toward nonproliferation. 44 This movement resulted in initiatives to assert 
civilian control over Brazil's dual-use technology programs, by removing military officers 
from decision making centers not associated with defense, and by shrinking the number of 
personnel involved in intelligence and security issues. 45 All these tasks are ones that the 
military governments or the Sarney government would presumably not have accomplished. 
Domestically, elections allowed the electorate to choose the President. This ability 
to choose permitted the masses to elect President Collor, who ran on a platform of 
market-oriented liberalism tempered with moderate social democratic principles. His 
policies specifically focused on the privatization of state-owned enterprises, curbing 
government spending, and reducing the role of the state in economic life. 46 President 
Collor' s platform also called for increased foreign investment and technology, while 
promising to reform the government budget. 47 Collor' s platform targeted the expansive 
military budget, with its associated arms industries. The platform, by focusing on the 
military budget, sought to redirect fiscal expenditures to non-military needs. 
The election of President Collor, therefore, provided a mandate for the culling of 
non-productive state-owned, or government-supported nuclear and conventional arms 
44 The Brazilian Physics Association was one such professional group (composed of numerous 
Brazilian physicists) which forwarded a report to Congress on the lack of civilian supervision of the 
military nuclear program. This supervision from the Congress had been mandated in the 1988 
Constitution. Ibid., p. 231. 
45 This change was most dramatically observed with the opening and subordination of the 
military's secret nuclear program under civilian control, when he personally began the dismantling of the 
military's nuclear test site in Cachimbo, as well as his promise before the United Nations and to 
Argentina that Brazil will not develop nuclear weapons. See Clifford P. Graham. "The Technological 
Imperative: A Brazilian Perspective on Dual-Use Technology," p, 235. 
46 Ronald M. Schneider, Brazil: Culture and Politics in a New Industrial Powerhouse, pp. 114-
15. 
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industries. The results of this mandate can be seen, m Figure 3, showing military 














+ 500 ~ 
~ 
-+--+---+0 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Brazil experienced high innation during the time surveyed, which makes calculations in constant prices 
somewhat unreliable. Data through 1989 in reals, from 1990 in thousand reals. 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database; http://www.sipri.se 
Figure 3. Brazil Military Spending- trends. 
In addition to providing a mandate, the imposition of civilian control also made the 
MTCR controls against Brazil more effective. This is because the impact of these 
controls, combined with his own domestic requirements (for economic growth, 
realignment of government spending, civilian control and international assistance) gave 
President Collor (as well as Presidents Franco and Cardoso) an urgent need to push 
through legislation for adherence to the MTCR. The desire for economic growth 
47 Ibid. 
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exacerbated the need for science and technology, 48 the very items that were curtailed by 
the MTCR. This desire for growth by the civilian leadership ultimately led to 
membership. 49 
In conclusion, it can be seen with regard to the independent variable, elections, the 
change to civilian leadership provided a situation in which the leadership was responsive to 
internal and external pressures (sanctions due to Iraqi transfers, domestic professional 
groups, the press, and Congress). These pressures pushed for a cessation of transfers to 
Iraq and the reallocation of capital to civilian purposes. This was especially true in 
comparison to the reduced impact these pressures would have had on the military 
leadership. This occurrence also coincided with the three civilian presidents' (Coller de 
Mello, Franco, and Cardoso) desires to curb military influence and spending following 
their inaugurations. Additionally, the impact of international and domestic pressures (for 
budgetary and technology growth), which were utilized as an election platform during the 
electoral processes, gave President Coller a mandate and the required public support for 
him to accomplish the stated goals. 
48 As President Collor noted, "The challenges of a worldwide economy are intensified in a system 
in which science and technology are the basic ingredients." See Clifford P. Graham. "The Technological 
Imperative: A Brazilian Perspective on Dual-Use Technology," p, 239. 
49 Jose Monserrat Filho, "The new Brazilian Space Agency: a political and legal analysis," Space 
Policy, May 1995, p. 124. 
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C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNANCE AND MEMBERSHIP 
INTHEMTCR 
The influence of governance (democratic institutions, parties, bureaucracy) on 
membership in the regime is not as clear-cut as the impact of elections. This is because the 
manner in which this factor of democracy influences membership is more ambiguous than 
the overt impact of elections. The facets of governance are the pathways and inner 
workings of democracy, as opposed to the clear, overt outcome of elections. 
Nevertheless, despite this ambiguity, the impact of this independent variable on democracy 
is still relevant to this investigation into membership in the MTCR, because it helps define 
what makes up democracy. 
Governance is partially comprised of Brazil's adherence to a rule of law. This 
facet of governance provided the basis for the Brazilian Senate's approval of President 
Cardoso's export control bill, Export Control Law #9112. The law's passage was a 
requirement for MTCR membership. It also gave authority to the government to enforce 
violations of the Brazil's export controls. 5° Brazil's membership in the MTCR would not 
have been approved if it did not have a developed judiciary system that the international 
community could trust. 
50 Arms control agreements presupposes the existence of stable governments in control of the 
weapons trade and able to enter into binding treaties or agreements. The reality of shaky regimes and 
ethnic discontent, along with multinational arms production among manufacturers, undermines these 
expectations. See Frederic S. Pearson, The Global Spread of Arms: Political Economy oflntemational 
Security. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 87, 93. 
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Another of the facets of governance, as defined earlier, is the concept of civil 
liberties and their guarantee by a responsible, representative, law-abiding government. 
This process, stated in the Constitution, assures the people that their desires for a better 
life are heard. 51 By comparison, the electoral process, another independent variable, 
would not have been responsive to the people's desires without these guarantees of 
freedom of speech, association, etc. Thus, the impact of civil liberties, in combination 
with the electoral process, put pressure on the competing parties and candidates to 
guarantee a more equitable division of domestic assistance. This popular pressure 
prompted the Collar, Franco, and Cardoso administrations to respond. This response to 
the people took the form of more international assistance, technology, aid, loans, and 
domestic restructuring. 52 This popular pressure, as mentioned above, therefore facilitated 
membership in the regime. 
Additionally, the existence of a civilian-led government run by a rational 
bureaucracy provides the basis for a fair distribution of assets. This distribution would be 
in accordance with the will of the legislature and the Constitution. These domestic 
institutions and structures guarantee that the government disperses its economic resources 
and executes its foreign policy, positively, and in response to the will of the civilian 
population. 53 
51 The lowest incomes have felt the most improvement from Real Plan, measured by explosion in 
sales in consumer appliances (color television sets, freezers), investment from foreign companies and 
privatizations. See Diana Jean Schemo, "Brazil Economy Is Booming, but Some Problems Loom," New 
York Times, September 7, 1996. 
52 John D. Sullivan, "Democratization and Business Interests," Journal of Democracy. Volume 5, 
Number 4, October 1994, p. 150. 
29 
In the Brazilian case, this institutional strength of governance manifests itself 
through the actions of the bureaucracy, and the elected executive and legislature who 
created the required laws for membership in the regime. The importance of the 
professional bureaucracy is that the numerous laws created for adherence or membership 
in the regime would not have been effective or policed. Further, the benefits of the 
redirection of domestic capital from state/military to non-military needs would not have 
been effectively transferred, with the resultant economic growth, 54 without a responsible 
government adhering to and allocating the legislated dispersal of capital expenditures. 
Finally, the many aspects of governance (constitutional, representative 
government; rational, rule-bound bureaucracy; the rule of law; guarantees for civil 
liberties) work in combination toward the subordination of the military to civilian 
leadership. 55 This subordination to elected officials by the military allows the government 
to redistribute capital to civilian needs without military confrontation. This acquiescence 
also facilitates the closure of military technology centers, and the halting of technology 
transfers (as required by the MTCR). This effect is due to the military's subordination to 
53 Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal 
Democracies," World Politics, Volume 43, July 1991, pp. 484, 511. 
54 The Cardoso Real Plan, has shrunk the inflation rate from 900 percent to 12 percent in two 
years, as well as stabilizing the economy, and bringing in investment. It also is attempting to curb federal 
spending, eliminate government jobs, and increase tax collection. The state companies will be made to 
sell non-operational assets to reduce fiscal deficit, with the possibility ofbringing the deficit under 2.5 
percent of GNP in 1997, from 3.5 percent in 1996, and 5 percent in 1995. "Brazil to Curb Spending, 
Eliminate Government Jobs, Increase Tax Collection," Reuters, 11 October 1996; "Go, Go, Whoa," The 
Economist, December 1996, p. 73; and Diana Jean Schemo, "Local Votes In Brazil Are a Test For 
Leader," New York Times, August 23, 1996, p. A5. 
55 John D. Sullivan, "Democratization and Business Interests," Journal of Democracy, Volume 4, 
Number 4, October 1994, p. 159. 
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civilian policing and budgetary controls of the bureaucracy, as well as the guarantees of 
civil liberties that protect the people from military violence. 
In conclusion, it can be seen that governance is vital to membership in the MTCR. 
The impact of this variable not only guarantees the MTCR-required basis for self-policing 
of indigenous export controls, but also provides the reallocation of state assets and capital 
from military industries. It provides the "transmission belts" for the population to appeal 
to their politicians, and ensure the national government's adherence to congressionally-
approved budgets. The existence and workings of governance also work to ensure the 
subordination of the military to civilian control through its linkages to the people, the 
Constitution, the bureaucracy, and to the rule of law. 
D. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL CULTURE AND 
MEMBERSHIP IN THE MTCR 
The influence of the independent variable, political culture (norms, values, and 
beliefs), on membership is similar to the influence of governance, in that it is also not so 
clear cut. This is because the forms of influence that political culture takes is also 
ambiguous. However, due to the fact it helps define democracy, it is also relevant to this 
investigation of its influence in membership in the Brazilian case into the MTCR. 
The desire by the national leadership, the elites, and the educated populace for 
Brazil to join the ranks of "responsible," stable and law-abiding nations, as well as taking 
its place on the world stage as a regional power,56 impacts positively on Brazil's decision 
56 Center for International Security and Arms Control, Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation 
and Its Control, Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1991, p. 77. 
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for membership. This belief by the Brazil people for greater influence on the global scene 
has prompted the government to weave its international relations toward a more 
respectable, and trustworthy status. 57 This belief has not manifested itself in the 
possession of nuclear weapons and missiles, because of the impact of technology controls 
against Brazil and civilian control over the military. These two factors have steered policy 
in the direction of nonproliferation. Civilian control has allowed the beliefs of the people, 
for economic growth and assistance from their government, to be translated into a halting 
of arms development programs. These arms programs were a drain on the treasury, and 
taking away resources from other domestic needs. 
This desire for international standing has manifested itself first by cooperating 
with, and then joining the MTCR, which enhances Brazil's legitimacy on the world stage 
and in the developed world. The ultimate manifestation of this legitimacy would be 
Brazil's achievement of its goal, a permanent seat on the United Nations Security 
Council. 58 Brazil's membership in the regime fulfills both of the two basic criteria for a 
seat, a sense of political-strategic responsibility, and the possession of the economic and 
technological conditions to become a regional power. 59 Thus, Brazil's beliefs and values 
have promoted its own self-realization to a level of international respect and recognition, a 
level of recognition that the MTCR has provided. 
57 Hal Klepak, "Finding its place as region's powerhouse," Jane's Defence Weekly, Volume 26, 
Number 17, October 23, 1996, p. 19. 
58 Wyn Q. Bowen, "Brazil's Accession to the MTCR," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-
Summer 1996, p. 88. 
59 Brazil possesses this, now that it is a member of the MTCR, and soon to be, space power, due 
to their responsibility as a nonproliferating nation. Mario Osava, "Brazil: Cardoso Seeks Heavy-weight 
Status for his Country," Inter Press Service, September 20, 1995. 
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Democratic governments must be more responsive to the demands of their 
citizens, partially due to its values, beliefs, and norms, desiring to assist the poorer 
citizens. 60 This desire expressed through elections and the transmission bands of 
governance serve to impel the leadership to redirect domestic capital from state and 
military industries to other non-military, social needs.61 This further influences the 
government to seek international loans, technology and development assistance which is 
made available with membership in the regime. 
Further, the people's desires for civilian control of the government, expressed 
through their participation in the electoral process, provide support to the leadership when 
facing the military in budgetary matters, and incites them to work to strengthen the 
underpinnings of democracy through the subordination of the military to the civilian 
leadership. 
In conclusion, the values, norms, and beliefs of Brazil work to make Brazil a 
member of the MTCR This is due to a desire for global and regional leadership, requiring 
mature adherence to international norms and a desire for economic growth and stability. 
This is gained through international assistance from membership and a national desire for 
civilian control of the country. This existence and nature of the political culture did not 
60 Bolivar Lamouvier, "Brazil: Inequality Against Democracy," Larry Diamond, Juan J Linz, 
and Seymour Martin Lipset, editors, Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with 
Democracy, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp. 162-63. 
61 An example of the civilian leadership redirecting capital from military industries is the 
discovery and closure of the secret Brazilian nuclear test site by President Collor. Jose Goldemberg and 
Harold A Feiveson, "Denuclearization in Argentina and Brazil," Arms Control Today, March 1994, p. 
13. 
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change in the transition from military to civilian government. The opening to civilian 
government only enabled the political culture to re-emerge as a force of policymaking. 
E. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND 
MEMBERSHIP IN THE MTCR 
The economic influences are discussed earlier in the analysis of the other 
independent variables. This is due to the fact that economics is one of the underlying 
factors that motivate the masses, the leadership, and the international community. It is this 
need for continued economic growth, to raise standard of living in response to the 
people's desires, for example, that prompted a realization that decreased border tensions 
with Argentina would enable a redirection of capital to domestic, non-military needs. 
62 
This resulted in the curtailing of missile production, facilitating membership. 
63 
Likewise, the election and re-election of civilian governments, under Presidents 
Coller and Cardoso, promoted a renewed look at the economic policies of the nation. 
This electoral process also served to focus attention on redirecting and reforming the 
monetary policies of the nation to improve social conditions. This improvement was 
promoted by a commensurate cutting of military spending, privatization, and public sector 
62 This decrease in border tensions might also be attributed to the democratic peace between 
nations, due to economic, institutional and electoral limitations controlling any belligerent actions. 
63 John R. Redick, "Latin America's Emerging Non-Proliferation Consensus," Arms Control 
Today, March 1994, p. 6. 
34 
reform. 64 These efforts decreased the amount of assistance the Brazilian arms industries 
received. 
Similarly, a decreasing desire by other nations for Brazilian arms, especially with 
regard to the Middle East (due to the end of the Cold War, the Iran-Iraq War, and Persian 
Gulf War), 65 prompted a re-evaluation of those industries, with regard to the amount of 
national assistance they would receive. This re-evaluation, combined with the change to a 
less supportive civilian government, inspired a decrease in federal assistance. The 
decrease in importance of the weapons industries assisted Brazil's decision to curtail 
proliferation, thereby facilitating membership. 66 
The decrease in amounts ofBrazilian arms exports can be seen in Figure 4.67 
64 Ibid., pp. 163-64. 
65 David Mussington, Understanding Contemporary International Arms Transfers. London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper, 291, September 1994, pp. 10-11. 
66 Interestingly, this re-evaluation prompted an increased need for space technology, due to a 
renewed emphasis in this direction by the government. Roberto Godoy, a Brazilian science journalist, 
"When Brazil changed its military presidents for civilians, in 1985, the program changed radically, giving 
up its military aspects and dedicating itself to launching satellites"; see "Brazil's Dream of Space Power 
Draws Near," Los Angeles Times, December 12, 1995, p. 8.; and Ronald M. Schneider, Brazil: Culture 
and Politics in a New Industrial Powerhouse. Boulder, Westview Press, 1996, p. 130. 
67 Note the graph due not use money, but trend indicator values. 
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Figure 4. Brazilian arms exports, 1980-95. 
The decreased ability of the arms industry to acquire crucial foreign technologies 
for further missile development, due to U.S.-led export controls, also impinged on 
domestic commercial rocket development. This lack of resources for the space program 
led to an increase in the impact ofthe regime's controls. 68 This was because the pressure 
of controls impacted when the government was attempting to convert from military arms 
production to peaceful space development. Ultimately, this pressure led to a re-evaluation 
ofBrazil's position on adherence and membership. 
The operation of a market economy works to provide linkages between internal 
actors, and from internal actors to external actors, through the transmission of 
68 Philip Finnegan, "Brazil Prepares To Sign MTCR," Space News, April 24-30, 1995, pp. 3, 29; 
and Jose Monserrat Filho, "The new Brazilian Space Agency: a political and legal analysis," Space Policv, 
May 1995, p. 126. 
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information, technology, loans, and international trade. 69 The benefit of information 
transmission positively influences a nation's membership in the regime. 70 This is because 
the free flow of information allows current members to investigate the ability of the 
prospective members to curtail proliferation, 71 in addition to allowing the nation to police 
itself This ability to police itself is required by the MTCR. 
The need for technology, loans and international trade in a market economy further 
provides incentives for regime members to use again proliferant states. This requirement 
for technology, loans, and trade acts as leverage against proliferating states, through the 
non-proliferating state's ability to curtail these benefits. Thus, the market economy 
strengthens the ability of the regime to work, by increasing the effect of its controls on 
proliferant nations. 
In conclusion, the influence of economic factors positively induced Brazil to join 
the MTCR. This was due to the civilian leadership's desire to respond to the needs of the 
people. This manifested itself in a need to continue economic growth, improve social 
conditions, cut federal spending, privatize, and conduct public sector reform. These 
factors, combined with a desire for a stable economy, lessened the economic influence of 
the arms industries in the country, decreased their amount of government assistance, and 
raised the importance of the civilian space program. This increase in the civilian program 
69 John D. Sullivan, "Democratization and Business Interests," Journal of Democracy, Volume 4, 
Number 4, October 1994, p. 159. 
70 As well as, strengthening democracy, by permitting people to be involved in their government 
and economy. 
71 M. Granger Morgan and Mitchel B. Wallerstein, "Controlling the High-Technology 
Militarization of the Developing World," W. Thomas Wander and Eric H. Arnett, editors, The 
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and decrease in the arms industry, with an associated increase in Brazil's desire for 
information, technology, loans, and international trade, strengthened the impact of the 
regime and of the leverage that MTCR members were able to bring to bear. These 
positive benefits, combined with the increased leverage of international pressures, induced 
Brazil to join the regime. 
F. SUMMARY 
The thesis hypothesis, that democracy is a necessary but insufficient condition for 
states to join the MTCR appears valid in the Brazilian case. 
Democratic elections allow for the civilian population to express their political 
cultural desires for material and monetary assistance. This is accomplished through the 
population's selection of appropriate civilian leadership and policies. President Collor 
received this mandate during a period of increased international pressure for non-
proliferation. This resulted in his administration beginning the stated goal of dismantling 
the military industries, improving the economy, and reorganizing state budget allocations. 
He provided the beginnings of adherence. These initiatives were built on by successor 
presidents to obtain continued access to the international economic and technological 
benefits that they also required. 
The structures of democratic governance provided the legal infrastructure required 
for membership in the MTCR, as well as the transmission belts or communication 
pathways required for the civilian leadership's electoral mandate to reallocate state assets 
and capital from military industries, and build the infrastructure to subordinate the military. 
Proliferation of Advanced Weaponrv: Technology, Motivations, and Responses, Washington, D.C.: 
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The impact of Brazilian values, norms, and beliefs worked to influence the civilian 
leadership by encouraging a desire to make Brazil a legitimate global and regional leader. 
This aspiration requires mature adherence to international norms, and a desire for 
economic growth and stability. 
Economic influence took the form of a requirement for continued economic 
growth, improved social conditions, cutting of federal spending, privatization, and public 
sector reform, due to a popular mandate to the civilian leadership. This mandate required 
more capital, loans, development assistance, and technology from the outside world. This 
was especially relevant for growth in the commercial space industry and national non-
military projects. This increase in the civilian program and decrease in the arms industry, 
with an associated increase in Brazil's desire for information, technology, loans, and 
international trade, positively influenced Brazil to join the regime. 
In summary, the effect of these democratic variables, combined with export 
controls, had more of a non-proliferant impact than with export controls alone on a non-
democratic nation. This is because the four independent variables enhanced the effect of 
the export controls. This accentuation resulted from the pressure on the leadership 
through the economy and through the democratic norms, events, structures and pathways. 
Democracy thus was the critical factor that enabled the pressure on the Brazilian civilian 
leadership to stop proliferation and join the regime. 
Additionally, although the four independent variables worked in unison to facilitate 
membership in the regime, the primary variables were the impact of the economy and the 
desires of the people, working through the democratic pathways, to influence the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1992, p. 295. 
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leadership during the electoral process. These desires of the people for economic growth, 
improved social conditions, cutting of federal spending, privatization, and public sector 
reform, as well as growth of Brazil into a regional and global power, led the leadership to 
membership in the MTCR. Thus, the most influential variables were the economic 
freedoms and political culture ofBrazil. 
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III. CASE STUDY: CHINA 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the influence of democracy on China's 
membership in the MTCR. The chapter begins by investigating the degree of Chinese 
democratic development, as well as the history of China's relationship to the MTCR. 
Foil owing these two sections, the impact of the four independent variables are analyzed 
with regard to China's membership. The chapter closes finding that the hypothesis is 
proven in the Chinese case. 
Despite the presence of democratic factors, China's lack of full democracy is 
hindering its membership in the regime. This is due to the fact that the Chinese domestic 
and international influences favor non-adherence and non-membership. It is these 
influences that would all be sufficiently minimized or curtailed with the installation of full 
democracy. Further, without the combined effect of these variables, the beneficial impact 
of democracy on the MTCR would not occur since each variable strengthens the others 
and enables their influence on membership. 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. History of democracy in China 
During the late 1970's, fundamental changes occurred in China's domestic 
environment. The end of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and the reemergence from 
internal exile of Deng Xiaoping, combined with his reintroduction of Zhou Enlai' s plan of 
the "Four Modernizations," induced the change toward market-oriented reforms. This 
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change was an effort to create economic growth, 72 to raise China up to First World status. 
In parallel with this change, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which still retains 
political control, began to introduce administrative, legislative, and legal reforms. These 
associated steps were Deng Xiaoping's portion of the program. The idea was that a new 
political order would be constructed. This new order would be more conducive to 
economic modernization, though without a resultant democratization of the country. 
Most importantly, it would do so while maintaining civil stability through the country, and 
political and military stability on its borders. 
Despite the CCP's efforts, events over the past 15 years have led to unintended 
consequences that augur well for democracy in China in the long term. Notable changes 
have taken place with regard to elections, and the degree of democratic institutions or 
"governance," as well as the beginnings of normative, and behavioral changes. 
As evidence of these changes, the rule of law is gradually emerging and acquiring 
constraining power against the Communist Party.73 The rule of law also is battling the 
rampant corruption which has resulted from the economic modernization's three forms: 
decentralization, increased freedom for market forces, and growth in the private 
economy. 74 The judicial system has begun forming subtle but important checks and 
72 The "Four Modernizations" were directed at farming, industry, science and technology, and 
defense, in that order of priority. See Conrad Schirokauer, A Brief History of Chinese and Japanese 
Civilizations. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publ, 1989, p. 617. 
73 Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, Volume 75, Number 
6, November/December 1996, p. 57. 
74 The most recent attempts have resulted in new laws targeting money laundering, insider 
trading, computer viruses, breaking into information networks, forced labor, illegal collection of blood, 
and the intimidation of a witness. See Seth Faison, "Chinese Revise Criminal Code, Not Its Essence," 
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balances against the ruling party's monopoly of power, 75 although without great effect. 76 
The National People's Congress is slowly beginning to flex their constitutional authority in 
the legislature by creating laws (mostly in environmental and social issues), 77 exercising 
their powers of confirmation and formal approval of key government decisions, and 
questioning the absolute control practiced by the CCP.78 Additionally, up to 72 percent of 
the population practice village democracy, either through universal suffrage or secret 
ballot, electing their own village chiefs and village committees (some villages in 1997 are 
holding their third or fourth consecutive election). 79 In the 1991 elections, 49 percent of 
the winners were non-Communist Party members. 80 Additionally, these village elections 
have begun to influence the provincial-level elections, with some candidates not being 
New York Times, March 7, 1997, pp. A1, A7; and Michael Johnston and Yufan Hao, "China's Surge of 
Corruption," Journal of Democracy, Volume 6, Number 4, October 1995, pp. 80-94. 
75 Official records show that approximately 44,000 private lawsuits have been filed against the 
government, in accordance with the Administrative Litigation Act enacted in October 1990, stating that 
the government has violated their civil liberties and property rights. In addition, laws on the books have 
been created to guarantee free access to legal council, and the constitutionally mandated right of freedom 
of speech and assembly. See Ibid., p, 69; and Elaine Kurtenbach, "China works on legal system," 
Associated Press, January 18, 1997. 
76 In the most recent revision of criminal laws, China eliminated the overtly political category of 
"counterrevolutionary" crimes in favor of those that "endanger state security." Despite this change, the 
manner of deciding cases based on guidance from Communist Party officials will continue, vice being 
based on legal opinion. See Seth Faison, "Chinese Revise Criminal Code, Not Its Essence," New York 
Times, March 7, 1997, pp. A1, A7. 
77 
"China's parliament-in-waiting," The Economist, November 2, 1996, p. 34. 
78 Andrew J. Nathan, "China's Constitutionalist Option," Journal of Democracy, Volume 7, 
Number 4, October 1996, p. 65. 
79 
"China's grassroots democracy," The Economist, November 2, 1996, p. 33; HenryS. Rowen, 
"The Short March: China's Road to Democracy," The National Interest, Number 45, Fall1996, p. 62. 
80 HenryS. Rowen, "The Short March: China's Road to Democracy," The National Interest, 
Number 45, Fall1996, p. 62. 
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from the CCP.81 These institutional, economic, and electoral changes also can be seen as 
evidence of a growing trend by ordinary citizens to become more politically active 
(primarily in defense of their newly acquired property rights and economic gains). In 
addition, they are becoming more politically aware (even if only at the grassroots level), 82 
expanding their democratic norms, values, and beliefs in society. The economic growth 
and prosperity has also allowed millions of Chinese to travel overseas, thus exposing them 
to democracies and their benefits to society and the individual. 
83 
Despite these democratic gains, the ultimate impact of these actions is still to early 
to predict. This ambiguity is due to the continuing Communist control over the central 
government, the bureaucratic structures, the press and other information services, 
84 
and 
the military (a reflection ofthe government suppression of China's most recent mini-waves 
of spontaneous pro-democratic activity). 85 This is especially true now with regard to the 
death ofDeng Xiaoping in February 1997. His passing has put the question of control and 
stability of the government to the forefront, 86 and increased the likelihood of a continuance 
81 Ibid., p, 63. 
82 Minxin Pei, "'Creeping Democratization' in China," Journal of Democracy, Volume 6, 
Number 4, October 1995, p. 75. 
83 Seth Faison, "Asia's Giant, After Detours, Takes Familiar Growth Path," New York Times, 
March 4, 1997, pp. A1, C4. 
84 Seth Faison, "In China's Newspapers, Few Tea Leaves to Be Read," New York Times, 
February 27, 1997, p. A5. 
85 These mini-waves were the Democracy Wall movement in 1978-79, the student 
demonstrations of 1986-7, and the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989. These waves constitute 
the main societal efforts at democratization in China. See Minxin Pei, "'Creeping Democratization' in 
China," Journal of Democracy, Volume 6, Number 4, October 1995, p. 68. 
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of authoritarian controls over the economy, institutional and bureaucratic government, and 
the People's Liberation Army (PLA). 87 The political institutions are also still at a nascent 
stage, despite the promising growth, with incompetent, corrupt bureaucrats and officials, 
and opaque laws, rules and regulations. 88 
As a result of these conflicting situations, the mass of the population is, for the 
moment, content to pursue economic wealth as long as the country remains stable, despite 
the growing grumbling about the corruption of the party and government officials. 89 
2. History of China's membership in the MTCR 
Interestingly, Chinese missile transfers were a primary target of the MTCR during 
its creation. 90 Despite this fact, the Chinese remained ambivalent about the regime, until 
1991. The Chinese attention to the MTCR was in response to a ban on computer and 
satellite sales imposed by the United States (and to a lesser extent :from other members), 
resulting in Chinese leaders announcing their adherence to the guidelines of the regime, in 
86 This is especially true, with the current questions concerning President Jiang Zemin' s ability to 
control China's disparate factions (military, civilian rivals, coastal vs. provincial factions, Xinjiang and 
Tibet separatists). 
87 It has been suggested that this policy of stability at all costs in an effort to maintain domestic 
growth will remain at least until the 15th Communist Party Congress, set for October 1997. See Steven 
Lee Myers, "U.S. Expects Few Changes In Relations With China," New York Times, February 20, 1997, 
pp. AI, A9. 
88 David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China?: Calculating Beijing's 
Responses," International Securitv, Volume 21, Number 2, Falll996, pp. 193-95. 
89 The chaos of the Cultural Revolution is still very well remembered. 
90 Wendy Friedman, "New Members of the Club: Chinese Participation in Arms Control Regimes 
1980-1995," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1996, Volume 3, Number 3, p. 20. 
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November 1991.91 The United States received this adherence in writing in February 1992. 
Despite this acceptance, confusion still continued over questions of how the Chinese were 
interpreting their agreement to adhere. 92 
The apparent confusion was evident because only after more threats and 
imposition of further trade restrictions did the PRC, in March 1992, halt the transfer of 
both M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan. This action resulted in the sanctions being lifted. 
Despite this reassurance however, by August 1993 new sanctions were announced. 93 
These were against PRC companies again participating in the transfer of M-11 
components and technology to Pakistan (as opposed to complete systems, which was seen 
as an attempt to circumvent the MTCR pledge). 94 In October 1994, after statements 
again from China to not export surface-to-surface missiles that are within the parameters 
ofthe MTCR, the United States again lifted the sanctions imposed on China. 95 
Doubts continued in the United States over whether China was or was not 
complying with the regime's guidelines through the summer of 1995, and again in June 
1996. This occasion was the American intelligence agencies' release of information that 
91 The sanctions were in response to transfers to Pakistan. See Timothy V. McCarthy, A 
Chronology of People's Republic of China Missile Trade and Developments. Monterey, CA: International 
Missile Proliferation Project, Monterey Institute oflnternational Studies, February 12, 1992. 
92 Wendy Friedman, "New Members of the Club: Chinese Participation in Arms Control Regimes 
1980-1995," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1996, Volume 3, Number 3, p. 20. 
93 This time as required by law requiring such sanctions. Ibid. 
94 Karl W. Eikenberry, Exolaining and Influencing Chinese Arms Transfers. Washington D.C.: 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, McNair Paper 36, February 1995, p. 
48. 
95 Not withstanding a minor bending of the sanctions in January 1994, to permit the sale of 
Hughes satellites that had been blocked. "Missile and Space Launch Capabilities of Selected Countries," 
The Nonproliferation Review. Spring-Summer 1995, p. 187. 
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they again suspected China of helping Pakistan. The cause of this infraction was evidently 
Chinese assistance with construction of a factory building medium-range missiles.96 The 
construction of the factory would be a violation of the MTCR, and thus a third violation 
of agreements by the PRC. 
The current situation is that the Chinese have only made bilateral commitments to 
the United States, to adhere by the terms of the regime, and are not formal members. The 
expressed reason for the Chinese rejection of the MTCR is that they were not participants 
in its creation, and that it does not include areas that should be controlled (i.e., sales of 
advanced jet fighter and bomber aircraft, especially important before and after the United 
States sold F-16 fighters to Taiwan in 1992). The Chinese therefore have made various 
suggestions to how it should be structured.97 
a. Rationale for MTCR violations 
The original sale and continued development of ballistic missiles to 
Pakistan can be seen as stemming from various factors. The export of these technologies 
can be attributed to a China-India rivalry, and Beijing's determination to thwart India's 
domination in the region by promoting a nuclear balance of power. 98 China possesses a 
9~im Weiner, "U.S. Suspects China Is Giving Pakistan Help With Missiles," New York Times. 
August 26, 1996, p. A4. 
97 These have been discounted by the members, since the question of "fairness" or inclusion at 
the MTCR's start, is not an issue, only meeting the appropriate standards. See Wendy Friedman, "New 
Members of the Club: Chinese Participation in Arms Control Regimes 1980-1995," The Nonproliferation 
Review, Spring-Summer 1996, Volume 3, Number 3, p. 20. 
98 India possesses the Prithvi series, and Agni and Surya missiles (Prithvi 150: Range- 150 km., 
Payload- 1000 kg.; Prithvi 250: Range- 250 km., Payload- 500 kg.; Prithvi 350 (in development) Range 
-350 km., Payload- unknown; Agni (in development) Range- 1500-2500 km., Payload- 1000+ kg.; 
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strong determination to create a strategic balance on its western flank due to fears of 
becoming encircled. 99 By promoting a strong Pakistan, it serves to offset India. This fear 
also contributes to greater cooperation, trade and commerce between Pakistan and China. 
This helps to bring China's western provinces more aftluence, in line with Beijing's policy 
for economic growth and global trade. This possibly mollifies outspoken groups in the 
western provinces (Xinjiang, Tibet), who are jealous of the coastal regions' successes, or 
desirous of independence. 100 
Another possible reason for China's infractions is a stronger influence by 
the PLA and other Ministries in government. 101 In addition, the PRC' s relationship with 
Pakistan has long been the province of the Chinese military. 
102 This relationship manifests 
itself in continued technology transfers. The continued pressures for transfers are also due 
to PLA and other Ministries' desires for hard currency that result from the lucrative arms 
trade. 103 Many of the companies are controlled by the children or family members of 
Surya: (in development) Range - 12000 km., Payload -unknown). The premise is that if China helps 
Pakistan secure medium-range missiles they would balance missiles that India, a larger and more 
advanced country, already has developed for itself. See "Missile and Space Launch Capabilities of 
Selected Countries," The Nonproliferation Review. Spring-Summer 1996, p. 187; Steven Erlanger, "U.S. 
Wary of New Headache With Chinese in Dispute Over Pakistan Missiles," New York Times. August 27, 
1996, p. A5. 
99 Bates Gill and Matthew Stephenson, "Search for Conunon Ground: Breaking the Sino-U.S. 
Non-Proliferation Stalemate," Arms Control Today, Volume 26, Number 7, September 1996, p. 17. 
100 Patrick E. Tyler, "Ethnic Strain in China's Far West Flares With Bombs and Rioting," New 
York Times, February 28, 1997, pp. A1, A7. 
101 For the extent of influence that the PLA now retains in decision-making, see June Teufel 
Dreyer, "The Military's Uncertain Politics," Current History. September 1996, 95:602, pp. 254-59. 
102 Patrick E. Tyler, "China Raises Nuclear Stakes on the Subcontinent," New York Times. 
August 27, 1996, p. A5. 
103 Bai Si Yeng, "Understanding the Chinese defence industry," Militarv Technology, March 
1987, p. 50. 
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current PLA leadership, 104 which hinders governmental control. This desire for exports is 
also due to the PLA' s need to subsidize their normal military operations, as well as to 
modernize the forces, to make up for budgeting shortfalls from the government. 
105 The 
money earned from these PLA companies serve to finance research and development and 
equipment procurement. 106 The sale of arms also serves to maintain a positive relationship 
with other states for their access to resources (i.e., China's deficiencies in future oil 
production can be alleviated by access to Iranian, Saudi Arabian, Iraqi, and Libyan oil). 
The need for supplementary sales from PLA industries to augment Chinese 
military spending are evident through the slight decline in budgetary expenditures, and the 
decrease in percentage of PLA budgetary allowance (or Military Expenditure) versus 
gross national product (GNP), that are shown in Figures 5 and 6: 107 
104 John W. Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litai, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms-
Export Enigma," International Securitv, Spring 1991, Volume 15, Number 4, pp. 91-96. 
105 This coincided with Deng's shift from the Maoist policy of"people's war" to that of"local 
war," emphasizing rapid-reaction forces equipped with quality weapons. See International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, The Militarv Balance. 1995-1995, London: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 270. 
106 Richard A. Bitzinger, "Arms to Go: Chinese Arms Sales to the Third World," International 
Securitv, Volume 17, Number 2 (Fall1992), p. 86. 
107 The graph of Military Expenditures vs. GNP does not show the impact of the growth in GNP, 
only in the declining percentages of military budgets; also important is the marked decline in 
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The continual governmental exhortations to rally around the nation, and 
other forms of Chinese nationalism are an additional factor fueling the persistent 
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confrontation between the United States and China over the weapons transfers. 
108 This 
agitation can in part be attributed to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, including F-16 fighters. 
These American transfers represent a proliferation of American high technology weapons 
into Chinese territory (given that the United States abides by its "one China" policy). 
These American sales onto Taiwan (Chinese soil) provokes anti-American nationalist 
feelings. These influence PRC government policy, combining nationalism with the 
leadership's need for legitimacy to make the leadership go against American desires (i.e., 
MTCR adherence). The sale of American aircraft to Taiwan are further perceived as a 
destabilizing factor by Beijing with regard to its efforts to reunify with Taiwan, causing 
additional negative feelings on other issues (i.e., MTCR). 109 
Furthermore, concerning regional politics, the PLA' s lack of force 
projection makes the arrangement of transfer of technology a positive endeavor. This 
would seem to provide a cost-effective way to remain a player in regional security affairs, 
even if it could not project power militarily. The transfers also provide a way to ensure 
continued access in North Korea, at little expense. 11
0 
And finally, the geopolitical notion of defying American efforts in the 
region tends to promote Chinese influence in Asia. ll1 The sale or transfer of technology 
108 Begun by Deng Xiaoping, nationalism is being used by the leadership to maintain legitimacy, 
in addition to economic growth. Edward Friedman, National Identity and Democratic Prospects in 
Socialist China, Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1995, p. 129. 
109 Wendy Friedman, "New Members of the Club: Chinese Participation in Arms Control 
Regimes 1980-1995," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1996, Volume 3, Number 3, p. 20. 
110 Eikenberry, p. 22. 
111 Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales- Few Changes for the Future," 
Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 563. 
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serves several purposes: to build Chinese influence in the region, while weakening the 
American influence; show support and show solidarity toward developing nations, and a 
way to solidify political ties with other nations; and serve to offset a possible perceived 
encirclement of China by other modem powers. 112 The Chinese have minimal national 
interest in stability in the Middle East and northern Africa. 113 Thus, they have little 
incentive for arms control and non-proliferation of conventional weapons, or to forgo 
profits from weapons or technology transfers. These are also at odds with American 
interests. 
Thus it can be seen that these economic, geopolitical/strategic, domestic 
business and political factors created an impetus for stepped-up arms transfers to a whole 
host of nations, and not only Pakistan. 114 
B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELECTIONS AND MEMBERSHIP IN 
THEMTCR 
At the moment, there are no direct elections for the top leadership in China, 
though there is some low level degrees of democracy that have been caused by the 
112 John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, 
Strategies, Goals," International Security, Fall1992, Volume 17, Number 2, p. 40. 
113 RobertS. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Volume 76, Number 2, 
March/April1997, p. 39. 
114 These include: Saudi Arabia, Syria, Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Afghanistan (rebels), 
Cambodia (Khmer Rouge), and numerous African nations (to counter Soviet moves). See Richard A. 
Bitzinger, "Arms to Go: Chinese Arms Sales to the Third World," International Security, Volume 17, 
Number 2 (Falll992), pp. 84-111; and See Timothy V. McCarthy, A Chronology of People's Republic of 
China Missile Trade and Developments. Monterey, CA: International Missile Proliferation Project, 
Monterey Institute oflnternational Studies, February 12, 1992. 
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loosening of economic controls in China. It is these grassroots-level elections that may in 
the future grow and bring on further democracy. 
Nevertheless, despite the lack of true elections, the leadership still requires a 
mandate or a show of legitimacy to remain in power, especially with the death of Deng 
Xiaoping, which is placing Jiang Zemin' s position in question. The notions of nationalism 
to rally and lead the people, through which the leadership is attempting to retain 
legitimacy, are negatively impacting on China's adherence and membership in the MTCR. 
This is due to the fact that these methods of maintaining a mandate from the people lead 
to confrontation and a need to retaliate against the United States (i.e., China's missile sales 
to Pakistan were perceived as in retaliation against the United States for F-16 fighter sales 
to Taiwan, against American wishes and against China's stated adherence to the MTCR). 
In addition, the benefits of continued economic growth also are in the interests of the 
leadership to maintain legitimacy. This need for economic growth also impacts negatively 
on China's membership, since it motivates arms sales or technology transfers. The growth 
of China's electoral process to the national level would allow the leadership to receive 
their mandate through a more direct and less confrontational manner. 
C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNANCE AND MEMBERSHIP 
INTHEMTCR 
PLA businesses, as well as other Ministries businesses, are conducting technology 
transfers without permission from the central authorities, or in violation of established 
adherence guidelines, due to the low developed level of bureaucratic oversight and 
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policing, few standards of the rule of law, and lack of serious national representative 
government. 115 These form of governance are needed to control business. 
There are few protections of civil liberties in China (though they are slowly 
growing in accordance with property rights), and as such, there is little direct pressure 
from the people for material assistance. This lack of oversight by the people allows the 
PRC leadership to divert capital to areas, and in ways, that do not directly benefit the 
people. This non-democratic situation allows public funds to be directed to corrupt state-
owned companies, and others that are owned by the Communist elites. These elite-run 
and owned companies violate China's adherence to the regime with their sales and 
transfers of technology and weapons. This non-adherence is due to the fact that they are 
not responsible to the central government or the people, and by extension to the PRC's 
stated adherence. 116 
The PLA also possesses a separate power-base in China's governmental structural 
hierarchy, by their not being subordinate to the civilian leadership. This is especially true 
in the current changeover of power that has resulted from Deng' s death. 117 It is such PLA 
independence in decision-making, and in technology transfers that allows them to bend or 
115 R. Bates Gill, The Challenge of Chinese Arms Proliferation: U.S. Policy for the 1990s, 
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996, p. 20. 
116 Tai Ming Cheung, "Serve the People," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 14, 1993, pp. 
64-66. 
117 Jeremy T. Paltiel, "PLA Allegiance on Parade: Civil-Military Relations in Transition," The 
China Quarterly, Volume 143, September 1995, pp. 796-97. 
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violate China's adherence to the regime, and also allow them to influence the civilian 
leadership's decision-making in a pro-military direction. 118 
D. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL CULTURE AND 
MEMBERSHIP IN THE MTCR 
The slight amount of national level democratic experience (though this is beginning 
to change in the National People's Congress) has for the moment left the people with little 
ability to influence the Communist Party leadership, either positively or negatively. This 
also has left the people without a voice as to whether China should adhere to the MTCR. 
There is a desire by the leadership to join the select ranks of technologically-
advanced MTCR members, and thus gain status as a "responsible," stable and law-abiding 
nation. This would possibly provide some modicum of legitimacy to the leadership. This 
legitimacy would be achieved through the perception of the leadership working with the 
other advanced countries, and also through gained international prestige. 119 It is these 
connections the leadership that might lead in a positive direction to membership. 
However, just as working with the other great powers might benefit the leadership's bid 
for legitimacy, in some conservative circles ofthe Communist Party, and in nations outside 
the First World, nationalism, international prestige and influence might be inducing China 
118 Ken E. Gause, "Jiang Zemin and the PLA," Jane's Intelligence Review, Volume 7, Number 6, 
pp. 277-81. 
119 Gerald Segal, "China After Deng," Jane's Intelligence Review, November 1994, p. 516. 
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to not join. 120 This means that the transfer of sanctioned technology might be a form of 
rebellion toward the United States. 
Additional normative desires to offset a more powerful, and soon to be more 
populous India, by building up Pakistan through technology transfers and economic 
connections, are leading to continued violations of the regime and thus to non-adherence. 
This is influenced by desires to lessen American influence in East Asia. The lessening of 
American influence is accomplished by showing how ineffectual the American-led export 
controls are toward China. 
Thus it can be seen how differing normative causal factors in China are leading 
non-adherence in the regime. Conversely, with the democratization of China, the 
normative need for legitimacy and the desire to offset perceived American and Indian 
threats will be diminished due to the influence of many differing viewpoints in the 
democracy and the legitimacy provided by the electoral process. 
E. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND 
MEMBERSHIP IN THE MTCR 
China's development has proceeded to such a level that it requires high technology 
for its continued international and domestic development. This need for technology, 
however, doesn't apply directly to missile development. This is due to the fact that the 
required level of technology for the missile's production has already been achieved (but it 
may affect communications, space systems, and other high technology). Therefore, the 
120 David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China?: Calculating Beijing's 
Responses," International Security, Volume 21, Number 2, Falll996, p. 209. 
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impact of sanctions preventing the import of missile technologies is not totally effective 
against the missile industries. In response to this ineffectual ability, trade sanctions have 
been directly applied to companies that have violated the MTCR for perceived violations 
of China's adherence. This has been accomplished by banning computer systems and 
satellite launches in an attempt to show American resolve. In reply, China has in many 
cases simply purchased the required items from the numerous other advanced countries 
around the world, in addition to subverting the sanctions by using other American 
companies. 121 This lessens the severity of America's export controls and sanctions and 
allows them to retain their ability to manufacture. Thus, we see that the American 
sanctions are being circumvented by other members, as well as seeing member violations 
of regime adherence. 
China's leadership requires economic development to maintain stability, a result of 
how the leadership maintains its legitimacy and mandate. This policy promotes continued 
technology transfers to other nations, especially with regard to the Middle East for cash, 
and ensuring access to oil. By the continuing transfers, these also result in continued 
violations against the regime. 
Sales of missiles and missile technologies also provide crucial money and capital 
for PLA and PRC Ministries and companies. These sales provide daily sustainment, 
modernization, and welfare, as well as supporting in the national economy by lessening the 
demand from the military for government funds. This requirement for sales is leading to 
violations of adherence. 
121 Nigel Holloway, "Playing for Keeps," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 8, 1996, pp. 
14-17. 
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Finally, businesses also may be conducting technology transfers either without 
permission, or due to the fact that the government does not know. This lack of 
information leads to further violations of China's adherence. 
Therefore, the numerous economic causes for violations of China's adherence 
include: a lack of bureaucratic oversight; lack of governmental budgetary control; a 
requirement for sales for welfare and modernization; a requirement for foreign natural 
resources; and a lack of international coordination among regime members. 
The institution of democracy at the national level would alleviate many of these 
problems because the democratic institutions would allow appropriate oversight. It would 
allow for legitimacy issues to be handled in a regular and institutionalized manner, as well 
as providing for an open discussion of the national security requirements of the nation. 
This public discussion would lead to an appropriate allocation of national assets to the 
military for development and welfare purposes. This result of this discussion would 
reduce their need to sell weapons. In addition, the establishment of national-level 
democracy would rein in the corrupt elite-owned companies that use government 
infrastructure and assets, resulting :from their status in the Communist Party. 
F. SUMMARY 
The hypothesis is proven in the Chinese case, due to the fact that the Chinese 
domestic and international influences which favor non-adherence and non-membership 
would all be sufficiently minimized or curtailed with the installation of the four 
independent variables at the national level: legitimacy; the PLA; the extra-governmental 
businesses that are circumventing adherence; Taiwan; resources; and strategic 
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international and regional influence. Further, without the combined effect of these 
variables, the beneficial impact of democracy on the MTCR would not occur, given that 
each variable strengthens the others and enables their influence on membership. 
This transition leading to adherence and membership is due to the nse of 
democracy, and an associated halt to missile exports. These exports would be in violation 
of Chinese adherence to the MTCR, due to the rule of law and to proper governance. A 
stronger economy would lessen the impact and need for missile transfers for economic 
reasons (because a more balanced and effective economy would be created). This in tum 
would halt the need for the PLA and other Ministries to sell missiles. The struggle for 
power requiring legitimacy would be lessened. In addition, the lessening of arms sales 
would lessen tensions with all bordering democratic states (India, Russia, Japan, Taiwan, 
Pakistan, Thailand). This relaxation would in tum allow easier relations with the United 
States. The democratization of China would also impose a lesser role on the PLA in 
government. This would decrease their authority to approve or conduct technology 
transfers, and subordinate them to civilian leadership. The democratic institutions would 
in essence allow China to police itself for violations. 
Therefore, democracy, including its four sub-variables, is a necessary independent 




A. COMPARISON OF THE CASE STUDIES 
In the cases of Brazil and the People's Republic of China, the thesis hypothesis, 
that democracy is a necessary condition for states to join the MTCR, has been proven. In 
the Brazilian case, it is due to the combined effect of the independent variables which, by 
definition, make up democracy, interacting with each other to make Brazil join the regime. 
In the Chinese case, it is proven due to the lack of the independent variables, which in tum 
is hindering China's ability to join the MTCR. 
1. Brazil 
In the Brazilian case, the effect of the democratic variables, combined with external 
export controls, had more of a nonproliferant impact than with export controls alone on a 
non-democratic nation. This is because the effect of economics and the public's desires 
for change, which had been influenced by the export controls, worked during the crucial 
election process to pressure the leadership. The choice of elected officials and ability to 
adhere to the MTCR were channeled through the democratic structures and pathways, 
facilitating Brazil's change to nonproliferation. 
The economy and population's desires for economic growth, improved social 
conditions, cutting of federal spending, privatization, public sector reform, and growth 
into a regional and global power were the prime causal factors to influence this process. 
These accentuated the impact of the export controls to influenced the leadership. 
61 
Therefore, democracy was the critical factor that enabled the pressure on the 
Brazilian civilian leadership to stop proliferation and adhere to the regime. 
2. China 
In the China case, domestic and international factors (need for legitimacy; the 
PLA; extra-governmental businesses that circumvent adherence; Taiwan; desire for 
resources; and the desire for strategic international and regional influence) favoring non-
adherence and non-membership influence the PRC's decision to adhere. With the 
strengthening of the four independent variables (elections, governance, norms, values, and 
beliefs, and economic freedom), which by definition equate to democracy, all of these 
detractors would be sufficiently minimized or curtailed to permit adherence and 
membership in the regime. 
Exports would be controlled or policed by rule of law and proper governance. A 
stronger economy would lessen the impact and need for missile transfers for economic 
reasons, halting PLA and other Ministries' sales. Elections would legitimize the 
leadership, resolving their need to export for nationalist reasons. The reduction of sales 
would lessen tensions with border states and the United States and curtail the need for 
technology transfers to offset rivals. The PLA would have decreased authority in 
government with democratic institutionalism. 
Further, without the combined effect of these variables, democracy would not 
occur. By extension, without these variables, membership/adherence would not occur. 
Therefore, without democracy, China will not have membership in or true adherence to 
the regime. 
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3. Summary of findings 
Democracy, due to the effect of the independent variables, influenced and made 
Brazil join the MTCR. In contrast, the lack of democracy in China prevent it from joining 
the MTCR. 122 According to these conclusions and the validity of the hypothesis, with the 
establishment of democracy in China, it should positively influence China to join the 
MTCR in the future. 
Further, the existence and functioning of democracy were lubricants that made the 
international sanctions most effective. This is because without democracy (and its four 
variables), the controls would not have had the intended effect of stopping proliferation 
and getting states to join. In the Brazil case, the impact of the sanctions acting on the 
elites through the desires of the people, impelled the leadership to adhere. In the China 
case, the impact of sanctions acting on the elites, without being transmitted through 
democracy, did not impact on the leadership as effectively. In actuality, the sanctions 
resulted in retaliatory actions from China. Thus, without democracy (as defined), the 
pressure from sanctions does not positively influence the leadership's decision to join the 
MTCR as much as with democracy. 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The current policy of "engagement and enlargement" in an attempt to spread 
democracy by the United States is therefore the right policy to get other technologically 
122 It is also pertinent that other countries might be a democracy but may have other 
circumstances to make it not join the regime (i.e., India, Israel). Thus, democracy is necessary but not the 
only condition determining membership. 
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advanced nations to join the regime. 123 It engages the non-democratic nations to become 
democratic in multiple areas, never directly focusing on problem issues (arms control, 
human rights) enough to cause adverse relations. 124 In combination with this is the need 
to continue the buildup of institutional structures and the rule of law. 125 This statement is 
valid, since exclusively applying export controls directly on a nation to join the MTCR 
would not affect the role of democracy. Exclusively applying controls will neither induce 
the leadership to join, since they are not directly feeling the pressure of the sanctions. 
Only through the influence of democracy can export controls apply pressure to the 
leadership and induce them to "join" the Missile Technology Control Regime. This 
democratic transmission to the leadership is due to economic factors, the importance of 
civil rights, elections and civilian control of leadership, accountability for domestic 
spending, and institutional bureaucratic oversight of the leadership. These factors enable 
and positively influence a nation's desire to join (i.e., Brazil); as opposed to applying 
direct sanctions or controls (without the structures, and beliefs in place to make that 
occur), which only negatively influence the leadership (i.e., China). 
123 This is similar to the idea that engagement is only a process and a vehicle with which to get 
China to integrate into the existing rule-based, institutionalized, and normative international system of 
regimes, agreements, and treaties; in other words, engagement is the means, and integration the end. See 
David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China?: Calculating Beijing's Responses," 
International Securitv, Volume 21, Number 2, Fall 1996, p. 181. 
124 R. W. Apple, Jr., "Clinton Concedes China Policy Hasn't Helped Much on Rights," New York 
Times, January 29, 1997, p. A6. 
125 This is currently being accomplished through the efforts of the International Republican 
Institute, an arm of the United States Republican Party. It trains Chinese citizens to monitor the elections, 
in addition to providing suggestions on how to conduct them. See "CHINA IN TRANSITION - Village-
committee elections are regaining popularity among China's peasants," Far Eastern Economic Review, 
February 20, 1997, p. 23. 
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